THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF REALITY 237 



verse. On the other hand, the attempt to give a perfectly accu 

 rate account of the event itself would equally involve a description 

 of the contemporaneous state of the universe. Completeness of 

 statement in either case means the entire loss of all significance. 

 No event is left and no cause can be adduced. How much, 

 then, of the preceding state of the universe is to be regarded as 

 the sufficient cause of any event? What degree of completeness 

 does truth demand? The only answer is: So much as is rele 

 vant to the purposes of the particular inquiry in hand. In fine, 

 what may be regarded as a true account of the event, and what 

 as an adequate description of its cause, is relative to the purposes 

 of the investigation, it is a practical matter. The case is 

 similar in regard to reality. What any object or event really is, 

 always depends on the context and occasion in connection with 

 which the object or event is considered. Taken at large, to 

 use Professor Dewey s phrase, the inquiry is futile because 

 indeterminate. The real, again, is always such by distinction 

 from the unreal, or the apparent, or even the ideal. The 

 ground for the distinction is always specific, and is to be found 

 in the particular circumstances and exigencies which have given 

 rise to it. The only general theory of reality (as of causality) 

 must be functional; that is, it must be an account of the general 

 service which the distinction real-unreal performs in our actual 

 processes of thought. Such, in brief, is the position which we 

 might suppose the pragmatist to take, and something of this sort 

 we might suppose him to mean when he speaks of the practical 

 character of reality. 



Let us now turn to what has been mentioned as the second 

 distinctive doctrine of pragmatism, namely, immediatism. In 

 the following discussion I shall, for purposes of brevity, confine 

 myself to a consideration of immediatism as it appears in Pro 

 fessor Dewey s writings. In this matter he seems to be in sub 

 stantial agreement with other leading exponents of pragmatism, 

 notably Professor James 1 ; and if the thesis which is here to be 



J We have pointed out in the preceding Appendix that this is not strictly true. 



