8 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



pairs of opposites which enter into its composition. Among 

 these pairs of opposites a prominent position is occupied by 

 pleasure and pain. The presumption that our formula holds 

 good of these is confirmed by an appeal to the facts of 

 experience, and it is certainly better qualified to serve as 

 the basis of ethical speculation than the wild and conflicting 

 doctrines of optimism and pessimism, which have no other 

 foundation than in the emotions of the men who profess 

 them. If, however, pleasure and pain are so nearly equal 

 at every stage of evolution that they cancel one another, 

 no residue is left over when either is subtracted from the 

 other ; and if pleasure is the sole test of value, it follows 

 necessarily that the value of life at all periods of evolution 

 must be exactly equal, and that the value throughout is 

 zero. This, however, is absurd ; for we find that in fact 

 some kinds of life are more highly valued than others. 

 Every one, for example, would sooner be a free man than 

 a slave, or a man than of any lower species of animal. Our 

 problem, then, is to discover the grounds of these preferences. 



Before we proceed to a direct attack on this problem we 

 must decide on a plan of operations, and select the method 

 by which it is to be guided. Our choice is limited. All 

 inquiries must be either scientific or teleological, and none 

 can be both. One of these infers the future from the past, 

 and its standard of truth is agreement with the law of 

 uniformity ; the other classifies its subject-matter with 

 reference to a future end, and its standard of truth is con 

 formity with that end. It is impossible to apply both 

 methods to the same subject-matter, because they are con 

 tradictory in this respect that one must deny freedom 

 of choice, and the other must affirm it. 



Our employment of the scientific method is barred ; for 

 the following reasons. In the first place, because all pre 

 ferences are based on valuations, and of values the law of 

 uniformity tells us nothing. All values are determined with 

 reference to a final end which is valuable in itself. The 

 value of science itself is teleological, and is derived from 

 the end which it subserves. The second disqualification is 



