10 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



which they are means. The concept is anthropomorphic, 

 and involves, first, freedom of choice, that is to say, absence 

 of empirical compulsion ; secondly, alternatives from which 

 the choice may be made ; and, in the third place, the 

 intelligent application of a criterion. These attributes, in 

 combination, constitute a personality. But a cosmic per 

 sonality must differ from any personality of which we can 

 form any conception. In the first place, it can have no 

 alternatives to choose between, and therefore no choice, 

 whether determined or free. Again, human purpose is 

 always partial, and indifferent to by far the greater part of 

 the results, whereas the cosmic purpose must include all the 

 results of its energy. A purpose that intends everything 

 that happens must be essentially different from human 

 purpose. A personality of some kind must be postulated ; 

 the necessities of our existence require it, and we should be 

 compelled to assume it, even if human purpose were proved 

 to be a chimera ; but it cannot be empirical. 



If we criticize the concept of design in the light of the 

 past history of evolution, we are led to the same conclusion. 

 The history of the past discloses no single comprehensive 

 aim to the attainment of which all subordinate processes 

 have been directed. It is not harmony, for the essential 

 characteristic of development is increased conflict ; nor the 

 preservation of the species ; and this for two reasons first, 

 because the higher are at least equally liable to destruction 

 with the lower, and, secondly, because the preservation of 

 the species cannot be an end in itself, but must be explained 

 with reference to some further end, of which we are in 

 ignorance. Nor can it be any form of pleasure, for increase 

 of pleasure is always attended by increase of pain ; nor, 

 for a similar reason, any other element in human nature in 

 isolation from its opposite. To say it is perfection tells us 

 nothing, for, if perfection and the final end are the same 

 thing, we know no more about the one than we do about 

 the other. 



There is indeed, as we have already remarked, one con 

 stant character which is distinctive of forward evolution 



