12 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



one class of conduct from the other. An opponent of 

 Hedonism could find no better support to his own views 

 than the admission, were it true, that happiness is the sole 

 end of action. But, fortunately, or unfortunately, it does 

 not square with facts. 



If our actions were always guided by our estimates of 

 value, and, which is the same thing, we invariably took 

 the best of all the values that are offered to us, we should 

 never act wrongly, for wrong conduct can mean nothing 

 else but the preference of a lower over a higher value. All 

 conduct being perfect, no ethical question could arise. The 

 plea of compulsion would be irrelevant, for judgements of 

 praise and blame postulate freedom. The mere facts that 

 actions are wrongly motivated, and that men recognize 

 and approve the good but follow what is worse, prove that 

 the value at which we rate a motive is not proportionate 

 to the strength of its influence on conduct. The primary 

 subjects of our inquiry are, therefore, our judgements on 

 motives, and not the degree of influence which those motives 

 exercise on conduct. That our valuations exercise some 

 influence on our conduct is not of course denied, and the 

 stronger that influence is, the better will be the resultant 

 conduct. When all other influences but those of the highest 

 values are excluded, the conduct is faultless. 



Our estimate of any specified kind of conduct (including 

 both motives and acts) is based on the consideration that 

 it helps or hinders the achievement of some end which we 

 regard as good. When the end is known, we distinguish 

 the conduct which conduces to it as useful. But the value 

 of the same conduct lies not so much in its utility as in 

 the value which we attach to the end it subserves. No 

 means are valuable in themselves. If we attach a high 

 value to the end, the conduct which helps us to realize it 

 is not only useful, but also valuable. If the end is bad, 

 the conduct is still useful, but it is the reverse of valuable. 

 Now the ends of human conduct are innumerable, and of 

 every conceivable degree of value and condemnation, and 

 some general end must be given before we can explain : 



