16 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



valuable in itself, but as a means to an end which is unknown 

 to us. The universal criterion of value is, therefore, ap 

 proximation to an unknown end. Finally, all evolution up 

 to the present day has taken the form of the parallel pro 

 gression of opposites, and, as long as the same process is 

 maintained, it must be impossible to discover that end 

 within the world of experience. 



There is thus disclosed an interesting parallel between the 

 processes of nature and the mind of man. The deeds and 

 desires of men may be either good or bad, as the processes 

 of nature are sometimes beneficent and at others destructive ; 

 but their value- judgements are always such as we might 

 put in the mouth of forward evolution, could that be repre 

 sented as a person reflecting with approval on his own 

 behaviour. The parallel development of adaptation and 

 misadaptation, and the narrowness of the margin by which 

 the organism, at all stages of evolution, maintains its exis 

 tence against the hostile forces of decay and destruction, 

 are reflected in the consciousness of man by the parallel 

 growth of good and evil. 



This, then, is our conclusion, and the main steps in the 

 argument which leads up to it. One other point remains 

 to be noticed. Ethics has frequently been identified with 

 morality, and described as the science of morals, or of how 

 a man ought to act ; but, if it is a study of value- judgements, 

 in their relation to a universal final end, this description 

 appears to be incomplete. There are many classes of 

 human achievement, which, if value means respect and 

 admiration, take rank in the first class of values, though the 

 term morality can only be applied to them, if at all, with 

 an extreme violence to common usage which is an almost 

 certain sign of faulty classification. It was not their moral 

 qualities which gained for Julius Caesar or Socrates their 

 assured eminence ; and it would be clearly absurd to rule 

 that all men ought to act as they acted. But of the value 

 of their conduct there can be no question, and either there 

 must be two or more ends of conduct or that value must 

 be determined by the same end which determines the 



