INTRODUCTION 17 



values of morality. The first of these suppositions is inad 

 missible. By following up this clue we arrive at the first 

 universal dichotomy of ethics. All values fall into one or 

 the other of two classes. They are values, either of self- 

 assertion or of self-effacement, of ambition or of goodness. 

 Of this pair of opposites, both are necessary for further 

 development, and, if the development is to be healthy and 

 permanent, the growth of each must be roughly propor 

 tionate to the growth of the other. 



For morality, in its more restricted sense, the whole 

 scale of values is ultimately derived from the reactions of 

 the conscience on the apprehension of acts either done or 

 intended by the individual himself or by his neighbour. 

 Those reactions (which are originally movements of attrac 

 tion and repulsion), when they are clearly reflected on the 

 consciousness, are generalized and translated into value- 

 judgements. The value- judgements of the conscience are 

 distinguished from all others, not only in their origin, but 

 also in their sanctions ; neglect being punished by remorse : 

 and in their being accompanied by a peculiar feeling of 

 compulsion or obligation. A code of values which is binding 

 for each individual is given to him by his own conscience. 

 Societies, making use of the value-judgements of their in 

 dividual members, construct from them codes of morality, 

 which differ from, and sometimes contradict, many of the 

 judgements from which they are generalized, being usually 

 more complete than the average, and on a slightly higher 

 level. An abstract system of morality has for its basis 

 the moral valuations of all the races of mankind, as far as 

 they can be ascertained, those of a stage of development 

 most nearly corresponding to our own taking the first rank 

 as evidence. 



Maxims of self-discipline and self-denial, and that is the 

 general character of the maxims of morality, are difficult and 

 painful to comply with ; whereas self-assertion is, in com 

 parison, both easy and pleasant. It is, perhaps, for this 

 reason that the influence of religion is usually on the side of 

 the former, and that the peculiar obligations of the conscience 



BENETT -g 



