DEVELOPMENT OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 57 



when the algedonic criterion is used, a very slight balance 

 of pleasure or pain will justify a positive or a negative 

 answer to our question ; and, according to the answer, 

 the theories fall under one head or the other of the classi 

 fication. 



The first question, then, is the following. Does pain or 

 pleasure predominate in the experience of men during their 

 life on earth ? This differs materially from the question 

 so often asked Is life worth living? in that it does not 

 assume that pleasure and pain are the sole criteria of worth, 

 or even that they have any worth at all. A further question, 

 closely connected with the above, is this Have we any 

 evidence from the history of past time that either factor 

 has increased at the expense of the other ? Should this be 

 demonstrated, the advocate of either side might be justified 

 (on the purely practical grounds, which serve as the sole 

 basis of our distinctions) in demanding that we should 

 suspend an approval or a condemnation which took only 

 the present into account. If there are good reasons to 

 suppose that the pursuit of earthly ends will procure a 

 decided predominance of pleasurable feelings, even though 

 it be in some remote future, it need not be condemned 

 merely because it has not yet attained its object ; nor 

 would a slight balance of pleasure in the present be enough 

 to recommend it, if it procured a life of pain for our 

 descendants. 



It might be thought that the definition was now com 

 plete, but we still have to define the leading terms. What 

 we mean when we speak of pleasure and pain is not so clear 

 as is commonly supposed. If we had distinct ideas on the 

 subject, we should at least be able to say whether our 

 ordinary daily condition is pleasurable or painful. Most 

 men, if they answered without much reflection, would say, 

 neither, but indifferent ; and after reflection they might 

 still be of the same opinion. But we are told on excellent 

 authority that all states of consciousness without exception 

 are either pleasant or painful, and that a state of complete 

 indifference, in which we should not care, on purely rational 



