DEVELOPMENT OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 71 



The ethical objection, however, is that the principle is se 

 lective of means only, and never of ends. It would facilitate 

 the satisfaction of all impulses impartially, whether they 

 were good or bad, and not of those only which tended towards 

 the realization of any particular ideal or summum bonum. 

 It could only facilitate the attainment of such an end if 

 all impulses tended in the same direction, and, in that case 

 too, there would be no selection of ends, but only of means. 

 Moreover, a view of life which denies the conflict of tendencies 

 is too plainly opposed to the facts of experience to deserve 

 attention. What may be conceded (and this, indeed, is of 

 the highest importance) is that hedonic associations may 

 perhaps add greatly to the certainty and ease of conduct of 

 all kinds. But here there is nothing which resembles selec 

 tion, and the use of that term would be out of place. 



It may be added that, in the same way, painful association 

 would hamper conduct of all kinds and depress the general 

 activity of the race. 



Do we therefore glorify pleasure at the expense of pain ? 

 By no means. What we have hit upon is one of the 

 most comprehensive of all the manifestations of the prin 

 ciple of the evolution of opposites. Activity without 

 restraint would be as mischievous as total inaction, and, 

 like that, would be inconsistent with further advance in 

 evolution. 



