CHAPTER III 



VALUES AND FINAL CAUSES 



THE foregoing argument has led to the conclusion that 

 life, taken as a whole, and universally, and without reference 

 to individual lives, or particular periods of history, comprises, 

 at all stages of evolution, equal proportions of good and 

 evil, whatever meaning we may give to those terms ; and is 

 not, therefore, in itself, and generally, of any value, whether 

 positive or negative. But, it was pointed out, all are 

 agreed that some lives are more valuable than others, and 

 it follows that such lives must rise above the general level 

 of indifference, and be worth living ; whereas others, which 

 fall below that level, are not worth living, and should be 

 declined by every wise man, could he enter on them with 

 a free choice, and with his eyes open. Our argument will 

 have little practical use, unless we can determine what is 

 understood by the term value. Perhaps the most commonly 

 accepted definition is approximation to an ideal, and we 

 may begin with an examination of this concept. 



Riickert tells us 



Vor jedem steht ein Bild des, das er werden soil; 

 Solang er das nicht ist, ist nicht sein Friede voll. 



And if by this it is understood that every man strives to 

 better himself after some pattern or another, the statement 

 may be accepted as generally true. But it is not true that 

 every man strives to improve himself after one and the 

 same pattern. Even in the same age and the same society 

 we find rival ideals contesting the field. The ideal of John 

 Wesley was not the same as that of David Hume. There 

 was, in fact, hardly a single point of resemblance ; and 

 between successive ages the discordance is yet more striking. 

 We may quote Mr. Spencer as representative of the period 

 we have barely left behind us : 



