VALUES AND FINAL CAUSES 75 



tance by overbold speculation is that the chances against 

 their being realized are about the same as against the 

 sun s rising in the west. For this, independently of the 

 argument from reasonable expectation, there are two 

 other valid reasons. In the first place the character of 

 an ideal depends on the relations which subsist at the time 

 between the organism and its environment. Both the 

 organism and its environment are subject to change, and 

 what form that change will take for either we are wholly 

 unable to conjecture. Secondly, and this is a consideration 

 for which we shall have much use later, an ideal is always 

 and necessarily partial, whereas the processes of nature are 

 comprehensive. Expectation is an enthymeme, by which 

 we infer the future from the past. The proper major pre 

 mise would be that the future resembles the past, but this 

 is so doubtful that we are not justified in formulating it 

 as a general proposition. The conclusion of is small value, 

 and even that only for the near future. Without a reference 

 to the past there is no premise, and, consequently, no 

 reasonable expectation. The law of reasonable expectation 

 is not the same as the law of continuity. The latter is 

 usually employed in arguing from the present to the past 

 on the principle, ex nihilo nihil. The former argues from 

 the present to the future, and has no concern with a priori 

 principles of any kind. 



As, therefore, all ideals are in the nature of forecasts, and 

 no forecasts have any reasonable chances of realization, 

 the concept of approximation to an ideal is no better than 

 a broken reed. It is not to be relied on as a test between 

 good and evil. 



A convenient expression for our judgement of an action 

 as good or evil is our valuation of it that is, the value 

 at which we rate it. This brings into prominence the fact 

 that, besides the broad distinction between good and evil, 

 there are gradations of both. Of two actions, both of which 

 are good, one may be better than another, or, when both are 

 bad, one may be accepted rather than the other, if both 

 cannot be avoided. The problem with which we are now 



