VALUES AND FINAL CAUSES 81 



it. But, even then, the functions of the intellect, in sys 

 tematizing the material which is submitted to it, are easily 

 distinguishable in principle ; and it should be its aim to be 

 on its guard against fashion and prepossession, and preserve 

 the greatest attainable independence. When it wilfully 

 departs from this aim, and falsifies its facts or its methods, 

 in the hope of establishing a conclusion which may appear 

 on any account to be advantageous, its action will certainly 

 be reprobated as dishonest. If we are required to justify 

 this condemnation, we must appeal to the common ground 

 of all ethical judgements ; that is to say, to the same prin 

 ciple which explains why we condemn corrupt perjury. 



It may, I think, be added that, if there is any value in 

 those elements of a philosophical theory which are contri 

 buted by the non-intellectual tendencies of its age, it is, 

 like those tendencies themselves, temporary and evanescent, 

 whereas the value of the purely intellectual elements survives 

 through many changes of fashion and emotional preference. 

 This may be illustrated by a reference to Darwin s great 

 theory of evolution. In that, the scientific demonstration 

 of a common descent has just claims to enduring value, but 

 the concept of degrees of fitness, which was borrowed from 

 the instinctive optimism of the first half of the nineteenth 

 century, is, I am convinced, destined to fall away from it 

 and be forgotten, now that it has discharged its function 

 of recommending the more valuable part of the theory to 

 the times in which it was published. 



The familiar ethical assertion that nothing has any value 

 except as a means to an end is parallel with the scientific 

 assertion that everything that exists must be both cause 

 and effect. Both overlook the necessary implication of 

 a recessus ad infinitum. If there is an ultimate final end 

 which is not absolute, then that, not being the means to 

 another end, has no value, and all our efforts converge 

 towards the attainment of a thing of naught. The same 

 is equally true if there is no ultimate final end, and our 

 exertions have no convergence, but are directed towards 

 the attainment of the innumerable conflicting ends of our 



BENETT F 



