82 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



several impulses. In that case also the ends would have no 

 value, as they would be ends in themselves, and not means 

 to any further end. All theories of value postulate an abso 

 lute value, which is an end in itself. In order that there 

 may be values at all, there must be some end which is 

 valuable for its own sake, and not only as a means. It is 

 true that the ends which are valuable in themselves may 

 be many, and at first it would seem that the ends of human 

 effort are many and unconnected. The ends of religion are 

 not the same as those of the senses or of morality, or of 

 ambition. But there are two considerations which go to 

 correct this view. The first, and perhaps the most cogent, 

 is that some ends are certainly more valuable than others, 

 and, in order that degrees of value may be accounted for, 

 some single standard of value must be postulated. The 

 other is that the same postulate is demanded by the exigen 

 cies of the principle of unification. What, then, is this single 

 value or end which lends their value to all human ends ? 

 The answer is quite plain and certain. We do not know. 

 All human action, therefore, so far as it has value, is directed 

 towards an unknown end. As a corollary, it may be added 

 that the distinction which we have lately drawn between 

 utility and value amounts to this. Utility is estimated 

 with reference to a known and proximate end, and value 

 with reference to the unknown end of all human conduct 

 which is valuable. A second corollary may be added. 

 If the universal end of nature is identical with the universal 

 human end, that too is unknown. 



The assumption of an unknown final end for both man and 

 nature is forced on us independently by other considerations. 



The attribution of purpose to nature is a direct result of 

 the impulse to unify experience, an impulse which has 

 certainly proved the main factor in our advance beyond the 

 state of savagery. Unless we connect the single facts of 

 experience under some law, however crude, we cannot have 

 either knowledge or reasonable beliefs. For the objective 

 facts of external nature, where exact measurement is pos 

 sible, the law of uniform sequence, with its constantly 



