90 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



our will. This is what distinguishes a purpose from a scien 

 tific series. If there is a general end, it is common to each 

 of a number of independent series, and not the concluding 

 stage in one. To regard a purpose as merely a link in a series 

 of indefinite regression annihilates the distinction between 

 the two forms of explanation, and asserts the universal 

 applicability of scientific law. 



The concept of purpose may be, and commonly is, em 

 ployed in connexion with three conceivable general ends 

 or determinants of action the human, the natural, and the 

 transcendental. Whether there is a universal human end 

 must be decided by an appeal to human consciousness ; 

 the right to assume the existence of a universal natural 

 end is dependent on the result of an application to the past 

 of the law of reasonable expectation : if we fail in our 

 efforts to ascertain both these ends, we are driven by the 

 exigencies of our nature to assume a transcendental end. 

 The human and the natural end may be conceived either 

 as conflicting or as harmonious, but it would be absurd 

 to ask the same question with regard to either of them 

 and the transcendental end ; and this for two reasons : 

 first, because we are unable to compare the known with 

 the unknown ; and, secondly, because the assumption 

 of a transcendental end will not be demanded by the exigen 

 cies of our mental constitution if other ends can be dis 

 covered within the bounds of experience ; and philosophy 

 will not be justified in making it. It has already been 

 pointed out that the same objection applies to the assump 

 tion of purpose in external nature. There too it is not 

 needed, and, in addition, it contradicts an explanation 

 which is always accepted as adequate. A single ultimate 

 result may be discoverable, but the intermediate processes 

 will not have been purposive. 



We may now proceed to interrogate our inner conscious 

 ness in the hope of discovering whether there is any universal 

 end to human action, and, if so, what that is. 



Reference has been made to Prof. James s view that the 

 ideal state to which our development is tending is one 



