108 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



that tends towards degeneration and destruction, are facts 

 which may be directly observed, and they argue an in 

 stinctive sympathy with the former. This instinct is the 

 source of all our valuations. It sits as an independent 

 judge on all our actions, whatever their quality may be, 

 and is not biased by the likes and dislikes on which it pro 

 nounces judgement, and which mislead as often as they 

 guide aright. In morality, the scale of relative values is 

 given for each individual by his own conscience ; for each 

 society, by the generalizations from the individual judge 

 ments of its members which are accepted for its guidance 

 by the community ; and for mankind at large, by such 

 generalizations as can be obtained from a review of the moral 

 judgements of all races, at all times, and in all parts of the 

 world. Such generalizations are the data for a philosophy 

 of morals. 



Similar data do not exist in the case of prudential or 

 algedonic motives, and in that department no objective 

 scale of values can be constructed on the basis of popular 

 agreement. The pleasures of one man are not those of 

 another, nor the pleasures of a man those of a woman, 

 nor those of a Chinese or a Spaniard those of an English 

 man. Even with the same individual the values vary 

 from moment to moment in the same day, and, still more, 

 with the different periods of life. They are often influenced 

 by considerations which are obviously arid admittedly 

 delusive, and it is a matter of philosophic doubt whether 

 they are ever the true determinants of action. The only 

 class in regard to which there is any approach to unanimity 

 are those which arise from a gratification of the senses, 

 and of the primitive animal instincts ; and those, however 

 powerful their influence on conduct may be, are ranked, 

 if not as evils, at any rate as the lowest in the scale of 

 positive values. This infinite variety, which is far greater 

 than any that is to be found in the valuation of moral 

 motives, deprives the objective valuations of pleasures 

 and pains of all general philosophic validity. Such valua 

 tions, moreover, have no binding force. There is no prin- 



