112 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



There is no conceivable end of action but pleasure ; 

 pleasure is the sole end of action, and any other end is 

 a physical and metaphysical impossibility. But we find 

 that some actions with an apparently lower coefficient 

 of pleasure are preferred to other actions with a higher 

 coefficient. This seems to contradict our premise, and we 

 must have overlooked some element in the pleasures. The 

 element which determines the preference can be nothing 

 but a difference in quality. The higher pleasures, therefore, 

 and it is those which are distinguished by an apparent 

 deficiency in amount, must differ from the lower in being 

 superior in quality. If a man fails to see this, it can only 

 be because he is not acquainted with both. 



The first criticism I have to offer is that the discovery 

 of the motives which determine conduct lies (as Mr. Mill 

 points out) in the province of psychology, or the study of 

 the human soul, and not of ethics. The subject-matter 

 of ethics are the judgements of approval and condemnation 

 which are passed on motives or conduct. It is true that, 

 without a knowledge of motives, it would be impossible 

 to understand or classify the judgements that are passed 

 on them, but for that knowledge ethics must be dependent 

 on another branch of inquiry. If the study of human nature 

 did show us that there is only one motive or end for all 

 conduct, it would not be easy to find a teleological explana 

 tion of the fact that some motives and conduct are approved 

 of, and others condemned ; but it does not, and it is a fact 

 that those judgements do presuppose a variety of motives. 

 Again, whether, as a matter of fact, pleasures do differ in 

 kind as well as in quantity is another question for psy 

 chology ; and the prevalent opinion in that branch of 

 inquiry is that they do not. Psychology, therefore, gives 

 many kinds of motive, and only one kind of pleasure ; what 

 Mr. Mill demands is a single motive and many kinds of 

 pleasure. The correct view appears to be that motives 

 are hardly ever simple ; that all voluntary actions are the 

 satisfactions of conscious impulses, and that they are all, 

 therefore, attended by some degree of pleasure. Actions 





