VALUATIONS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 117 



forms of excellence ; and these illustrations are far from 

 standing alone. If the higher qualities miss recognition 

 anywhere, it is in the writings of hedonist philosophers 

 who, in trying to detect the pleasures, are blinded to the 

 real greatness of the nobler types of character. Mr. Mill 

 is not himself open to this reproach. His statement of the 

 problem is pervaded by an elevated moral sentiment which 

 would not be unworthy of Kant ; but of the great majority, 

 and, among them, some of the most eminent, it is literally 

 true. Their spirit, when it has filtered down to a lower 

 level, sets up a process of corruption, which explains and 

 justifies the dislike and apprehension which hedonism 

 and utilitarianism have always aroused in all classes of 

 a healthy society. The same instinct which compels men 

 to respect greatness teaches them to recognize and avoid 

 the doctrines of degeneration. 



To this it may be added that the man who is acquainted 

 with both will be the most ready to deny that his higher 

 conduct has been determined by considerations of pleasure 

 in any form. When he has faced ruin rather than dishonour, 

 he will regard it as an insult to be told that his choice had 

 been determined by the prospect of the resultant pleasure ; 

 whereas a man with a less highly developed sense of honour 

 who has only tried one of the supposed pleasures, will, in 

 the absence of evidence to the contrary, be ready to believe 

 that it was so determined. 



We have, then, the following grounds for suspecting the 

 hypothesis of differences of quality in pleasures, when it 

 is used to explain the fact that the choice of conduct is not 

 always determined by the prospect of the greatest apparent 

 quantity. In the first place, it is not countenanced by 

 psychology, and that is the branch of thought to which 

 such problems properly belong. Secondly, even if dis 

 tinctions of quality do exist, they fail to explain the 

 difficulty. As the superior quality must be derived from 

 the nervous temperament of the agent, and not from the 

 actions themselves, it will be common to all his feelings, 

 pleasure and pain alike, and as the pain and the pleasure 



