VALUATIONS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 119 



then, of the case before us gives a large class of motives 

 which agree among themselves in the following particulars : 

 first, that they are the latest products of evolution, and, 

 secondly, that they operate independently of a calculation 

 of the amount of resultant pleasure, while they differ 

 in both respects from all other classes of motives. It seems 

 only reasonable to suppose that the explanation of the 

 second of these special features may be found in the first, 

 that is to say, in the circumstance that they are the most 

 lately developed ; and that no other explanation is wanted. 

 In other words, that the sense of dignity is itself the deter 

 minant, and not the prospect of pleasure, and that the 

 prospect of pleasure is therefore not the universal deter 

 minant. 



All conduct may, I think, be accounted for by one or the 

 other of these two determinants ; that is to say, either by 

 the prospect of pleasure or by one of that large class of 

 motives which depend for their force on our regard for 

 our place in the scale of evolution. But it is not often that 

 the latter motive can be completely isolated. The satis 

 faction of nearly all impulses is attended by some degree 

 of pleasure, and, were it not for the fact that conduct which 

 has inferior is often preferred to conduct which has 

 superior hedonic attractions, it would, perhaps, be diffi 

 cult to prove to the satisfaction of a man who was not 

 already convinced by introspection of the existence of 

 other than hedonic determinants that such determinants 

 did in fact exist. There is very little conduct which is 

 entirely devoid of pleasure in the achievement, and it is 

 open to the hedonist to assert, however palpable the absur 

 dity may be, that it was that slight element which determined 

 the choice. Such assertion would, however, be defeated 

 on his own assumptions by the demonstration of superior 

 hedonic attractions in the conduct which is rejected. There 

 is, moreover, some conduct for which hedonic attractions 

 are wholly wanting. When the realization is postponed 

 to beyond the grave, and the wished for result is one which 

 the actor can never hope to see, it is out of the question 



