VALUATIONS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 121 



paper ; but in practice they are not always easily recog 

 nizable. It is seldom easy to say at once with regard to 

 any particular line of conduct whether the motive which 

 recommends it is predominantly ethical or prudential. 

 It is a characteristic of prudential dilemmas that the argu 

 ments for and against either choice are usually very evenly 

 balanced. The conclusion is a mere matter of opinion, 

 one man being in favour of, and another against, any course 

 that may be suggested. Hence it comes that there are not 

 many actions for which prudential reasons of some kind 

 may not be assigned. This holds good even in immediate 

 results. The more distant the prospect, the less certain are 

 the conclusions of prudence, and, when the happiness of 

 others besides ourselves is added, the equation becomes 

 practically insoluble. In all questions concerning distant 

 results in all, therefore, in which we are most in want of 

 guidance prudence will advance equally strong reasons 

 on either side. Again, pleasure and pain occupy so large 

 a place in the consciousness of mankind, that other deter 

 minants of action, though they may be really stronger in 

 effect, are apt to be lost sight of when both are concurrent. 

 It follows that a much more conspicuous position than they 

 deserve is accorded in unreflecting belief to prudential as 

 compared with ethical motives. It is not recognized to 

 what an extent we are dominated by aims for which we can 

 give no true reason, except that they are good. 



Enough has been said on the subject of the relative values 

 of pleasure, and what have been classed as the ethical 

 impulses, when regarded as motives to action. It only 

 remains to compare the values of the main branches of 

 ethical motives, that is to say, the moral, and what have 

 been distinguished as those of ambition and eminence. 

 When religion influences choice of conduct, it must be, 

 either through the conscience, or by holding out prospects of 

 pleasure and pain ; and it is not therefore necessary to deal 

 with it separately in this context. Our task is narrowed 

 to a comparison of the relative values of the conscience 

 and the desire of eminence. Before proceeding to this, 



