CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 137 



judgement as to which is the best, and therefore his duty, 

 will depend solely on the strength of the attraction which 

 is exercised on him by the idea of it. 



Our aim hitherto has been to confine our description, 

 as nearly as possible, to the manifestations of the individual 

 conscience, avoiding all reference to the objectivated moral 

 law of which they are the basis. But a complete separation 

 is not possible. The reaction of the moral beliefs of the 

 community on the consciences of its individual members 

 is so powerful and so continuous that neither can be made 

 intelligible by itself, and independently of all reference to 

 the other. This is especially the case when we proceed to 

 deal with the differences of certainty which, as well as 

 differences of strength, are to be found in the moral 

 judgements of the individual. One explanation of the 

 existence of such differences appears to be, that whereas 

 some motives are nearly of universal validity, and are 

 rarely, if ever, in moral opposition to others, there are 

 others, which, though if they stood by themselves they 

 would at once be recognized as virtuous, are opposed by 

 other contradictory motives of practically equal worth. 

 There is no hesitation in our judgements on murder, 

 treachery, and ingratitude, but, if an unreflecting man were 

 asked whether independence of character or obedience 

 were the greatest virtue, it is probable that an immediate 

 answer would not be forthcoming. With regard to one 

 and the same act the two motives are conflicting, and 

 mutually exclusive. If a man receives a command, he 

 cannot at the same time obey it and assert his independence. 

 Where we find opposition of motives we usually, if not 

 invariably, find opposition of character. The natural bias 

 of some men is towards independent, in others towards 

 concerted action, and if the education is in each case in har 

 mony with the bias, the one will rank self-assertion, the 

 other obedience, as the higher virtue. It follows that there 

 is not the same consensus of opinion about these as there 

 is about other motives. Any wide induction per capita 

 would be obliged to admit the existence of a large 



