CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 139 



mischievous in a cold country, where it is abhorred, than in 

 a hot country, where it is tolerated. 



The true explanation appears to be that the conscientious 

 regard for truth is correlated to the whole character in the 

 same way as each part of the physical organism is correlated 

 to the rest. It is one feature in what we are accustomed 

 to denote as the manly character, and will be found in alli 

 ance with independence, pride, and contempt of peril, and 

 even of the good opinion of others : a man may tell the 

 truth simply because he does not think it worth while to 

 conciliate the goodwill of his neighbour. If slavery makes 

 men untruthful, it is merely because it takes away half 

 their manliness. A climate that depresses the vigour of 

 mind and body will have the same effect. However highly 

 we may rank the virtue, its absence from the less vigorous 

 type of character may be compensated by other virtues 

 peculiar to that type, and does not necessarily imply in 

 feriority of the character as a whole. It would shock our 

 moral convictions to assert that the character of women 

 generally, is of an inferior type to that of men ; but their 

 reaction to an untruth is usually far less marked. 



We may distinguish the moral love of truth from the 

 prudential regard for it. The honour of thieves is due to 

 fear of consequences, and not rooted in their conscience. 

 In this respect one nation differs little from another, and 

 if there is a difference, it is derived from differing degrees 

 of foresight. 



The consciouspropulsion towards the performance of a duty, 

 and, generally, the hunger and thirst after righteousness, 

 are easily distinguished from what is known as desire. What 

 we desire, in the narrower sense of the word, is not any 

 particular action, but the feeling which we expect to accom 

 pany it. The common opinion is that what we desire is 

 pleasure, and that the idea of pleasure is always in the mind 

 when it desires. Pleasure of some kind is the end of desire. 

 But the end of a moral disposition is the conformity of the 

 action with the commands of the conscience, or a temper 

 that will securely establish that conformity ; and nothing 



