140 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



further. It is true that the conscience has its special 

 sanctions, and that the sanctions of religion apply to most, 

 and those of the law to many of the actions to which the 

 moral sanctions are attached, but none of these need 

 be present to the mind when it is set on the attainment 

 of virtue ; and all are commonly absent. The desire of virtue 

 for its own sake may be so strong as to exclude all con 

 sideration of consequences, and if it is genuine, it always 

 has strength of its own, even when other motives are present. 

 It might be thought sufficient for our purpose to distinguish 

 the desire for virtue as being determined exclusively by the 

 ideas of its own peculiar sanctions. But this would be 

 untrue to experience. If it were not so frequently con 

 tradicted, it would seem superfluous to repeat that virtue 

 is its own reward, and is sought for its own sake, and not 

 with reference to any consequence in this world or the next. 

 If our conduct were determined by a consideration of the 

 resultant happiness, there could be no degrees of moral 

 value, as we are certainly unable to say whether obedience 

 to one moral law or another will produce the greater degree 

 of happiness. 



These considerations may be extended to that kind of 

 conduct of which the object is not ourselves but our neigh 

 bour. We may benefit our neighbour in two ways, that is 

 to say, by increasing the sum of his pleasures or by making 

 him more virtuous. In the first case, we facilitate such 

 conduct in him as has pleasure or the saving of pain for its 

 result ; in the second, our final end is his conduct itself, and 

 not any further state arising out of it. Similarly, we may 

 harm him either by reducing the sum of his pleasures and 

 increasing his pains, or by making him less moral. If the 

 loss is moral, he is degraded, but his algedonic balance may 

 remain unaffected. We are not at present concerned with 

 values, but we are tempted to remark that moral injury has 

 in all times been regarded as more serious than the loss of 

 pleasures. The infliction of pain is justified as a means to 

 moral improvement; but no increase in the scale of pleasure, 

 however great, will compensate for the least deterioration 



