CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 145 



other reason. That this definition is imperfect may be 

 gathered from his own illustrations. A good jump, he 

 says, is a jump which, remoter ends ignored, achieves the 

 immediate purpose of a jump ; and a stroke at billiards is 

 called good when the movements are skilfully adjusted to 

 the requirements. What, however, is called good in both 

 these cases is the skill itself, irrespective of any end. A jump 

 of six feet may perfectly achieve the purpose of landing you 

 on the other side of a brook, and may, by putting that 

 between you and a mad bull, preserve you from discomfort, 

 or worse, but, as it calls for no special skill, we do not call 

 it either good or bad in itself ; a jump of twenty feet is 

 a good jump, even if it sprains your ankle, because it requires 

 exceptional skill. Similarly, at billiards, an easy cannon 

 will hardly be called a good stroke, except when the per 

 former is a novice, and then only because it shows more 

 skill than was expected. The same principle may be 

 illustrated from sport. A sportsman goes forth to procure 

 game for his dinner. His purpose is fully achieved when 

 he shoots a doe sitting, but very imperfectly when he shoots 

 a snipe on the wing at a long range. Nevertheless, the first 

 shot will not be called good, and the second will. In all 

 these cases the end is a quality in the action itself, and 

 nothing ulterior or extrinsic. If it be suggested that the 

 end in these cases is love of applause, it would still remain 

 to be explained why such actions are applauded. Even if 

 we admit, in the teeth of experience, that the love of 

 applause is the sole motive, the applause does not con 

 stitute the goodness, but is merely a token of appreciation. 

 Neither do such actions produce excellence. Their ex 

 cellence is in themselves. They are not, however, moral, 

 in any ordinary sense of the word. Success in sport 

 does not constitute moral goodness, or even guarantee 

 it. Their criterion is conformity with an external standard 

 of achievement. 



The criterion of moral goodness is conformity with the 

 commands of conscience, and it is this which differentiates 

 it from other forms of value. In other respects the two 



BENETT IT 



