146 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



classes are alike. The performance of duty is valued on 

 its own account, and not for any ulterior consequence, 

 and in the case of both the determining principle is 

 the self. In the second point they both agree, and in 

 the first they both differ from conduct which has pleasure 

 as an ulterior end which is not the same thing as the 

 action itself. 



An important difference between the goodness of actions 

 regarded as ends in themselves and the goodness of means 

 as directed towards an end is the following. The first 

 is a subjective feeling, and does not admit of discussion. 

 For the valuation of an end we have no criterion but our 

 sense of its value. This is true of pleasure itself. It is 

 useless to discuss whether pleasure ought to be valued, or 

 is really good ; but whether men actually do value it, and, 

 if so, how highly and exactly in what way, when it is com 

 pared with other ends of action, are open questions, and the 

 same questions may be asked with respect to any other 

 end of action. On the other hand, the value of means for 

 the attainment of a prescribed result is a fruitful and legiti 

 mate subject of debate. If a man values life, or the power 

 to act, generally, as a means for procuring pleasures, 

 every other man he meets will be ready to dispute his 

 opinion ; if for its own sake, there is no room for 

 argument. There is a further sense in which the goodness 

 of an action which is an end in itself may be regarded as 

 goodness of means ; that is to say, when its value is 

 explained by reference to some general transcendental end. 

 But even then it still retains the character of an empirical 

 or proximate end. 



A special distinction of moral goodness is found in the 

 feelings which accompany the reactions of the conscience. 

 We are aware of a strong obligation to perform such actions 

 as attract the conscience, and to refrain from such actions 

 as repel it. Obligation is not the same feeling as desire, 

 and is, indeed, frequently opposed to it. Again, no such 

 feeling as remorse follows the failure to attain a hoped for 

 pleasure. It would be a waste of time to stop to dis- 



