CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 147 



tinguish remorse from disappointment. There are other 

 kinds of good, such as aesthetic good, which it is unnecessary 

 to treat of here ; but there is one which the prominent part 

 it has played in ethical theory entitles to special mention 

 that is, the approximation to an imaginary pattern, 

 or ideal. A tailor will call a coat good which closely follows 

 an ideal cut, though it may be ugly, uncomfortable, and of 

 inferior stuff. Behaviour is called good, or in good form, 

 when it conforms with an artificial social standard, which 

 has no moral quality whatever. 



Obligation exists when there are circumstances which 

 interfere with freedom of choice. These circumstances 

 may be either external or internal. A galley-slave is obliged 

 to pull his oar ; a man who is very hungry is obliged to eat ; 

 or if very tired, to sleep. Moral obligation is distinct from 

 other forms in being created by the internal commands of 

 the conscience. Obligations have varying degrees of 

 strength. The obligation of a schoolboy to stay within 

 bounds varies with the vigilance with which the rule is en 

 forced ; and the same is true of the obligations of the 

 conscience ; they vary in strength with the moral character 

 of the individual. The stronger a man s conscience is the 

 more regular will be the conformity of his actions with its 

 commands, and in the strongest it will prevail against 

 all other motives. Luther s well-known Ich kann nicht 

 anders , when every other motive was in opposition, illus 

 trates the utmost strength of moral obligation. The cir 

 cumstances which impose a moral obligation give rise, at 

 the same time, to a special feeling. When a man is aware 

 of this in regard to any action, he says that he ought to do 

 or to omit it. He will also admit that he ought to do a 

 thing which is approved by the general moral conscious 

 ness of his neighbours, though his own conscience, from 

 some natural infirmity, may be silent. In this case, again, 

 the obligation will be moral. 



The connotations of the terms ought and obligation 

 are not coextensive. We are obliged to do many things 

 of which we do not say that we ought to do them, and others 



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