CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 149 



without. The constraint of moral obligation is imposed 

 from within, and may be of varying degrees of force. 

 If it is absolute and irresistible, as in the case of Martin 

 Luther, the freedom, if any, to impose it, must be of another 

 kind than that which is commonly meant when we speak 

 of freedom of choice after deliberation. It must reside 

 in some agency which is not among the facts which are 

 present in our mind. If, however, as is usually the case, 

 the constraint is not absolute, but rather in the nature of 

 influence, we may speak of freedom of choice in the ordinary 

 acceptance of the words. Whether the freedom is really 

 different in the two cases, that is, when there is a choice 

 and when there is none, is a question which we need not stop 

 to discuss. 



The preceding sections may be summed up as follows. 

 When we predicate moral goodness or badness of any action, 

 we mean that the instinctive reaction of our conscience, 

 when the idea of that action is presented to it, is one of 

 attraction or of repulsion. Considerations of any further 

 end, such as algedonic efficiency, or the approximation 

 to any ideal standard or end, may indeed be put forward 

 as ex post facto explanations, but are certainly absent 

 from the mental process at the time. The reactions of 

 the conscience are distinguished from all other reactions 

 of attraction and repulsion by being accompanied by 

 a peculiar feeling of obligation, which, when translated into 

 judgements, becomes, I ought to do this, or I ought not ; 

 and in being followed by a peculiar feeling of happiness 

 when the obligation is discharged, or of remorse when it 

 is neglected. A duty is that conduct in respect of which 

 a moral obligation exists. Of the two classes of judgements 

 which are based on the conscience, the first, that is, this is 

 good or bad, is the foundation of objective morality ; the 

 second, that is, I ought or ought not to do this, is and 

 remains purely subjective. It may, indeed, be coerced 

 by contradictory judgements of objective morality, but its 

 truth and its cogency for the individual are even then 

 unaffected. This, however, is a point which must be 



