CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 151 



of above propositions admits of being inverted. It would 

 be absurd to say I wish to save my country in order to be 

 obedient, or to save my wife and children in order to save 

 my country ; and if we must choose one of the motives 

 as the real one (for they cannot both be that) it must be 

 the first ; for it cannot without absurdity be regarded 

 as a result, nor, if it is extinguished, can it operate as a means. 

 There is, of course, nothing in this argument which prevents 

 all three motives from acting concurrently. One may be 

 uppermost in the mind at one time, and another at another, 

 and all three may mutually strengthen and confirm each 

 other in supporting the same course of action. All that is 

 shown is that an ethical end can never be regarded as a means, 

 even to another ethical end. It then loses its distinctive 

 character ; it no longer proceeds from the direct commands 

 of the conscience, but becomes a matter of discussion and 

 inference. 



It might, perhaps, be inquired, How, then, are we to 

 classify a man s intermediate conduct, when an action which, 

 when regarded by itself, is ethical, is employed as a means to 

 another ethical end ? It would excite the same admiration, 

 and be equally free from the taint of self-regarding motives 

 as if it had proceeded from its appropriate ethical motive ; 

 if, for instance, a man obeyed, not because he was obedient, 

 but because he was intellectually convinced that by obeying 

 he would best serve the interests of his country. The answer 

 is not difficult. Whatever the end may be, it gives its own 

 character to all the actions which serve as a means to it. 

 If a man obeys in order to gain wealth or renown, his action 

 is no longer ethical, but prudential or ambitious ; if he is 

 prudent in choosing times and occasions in advancing an 

 ethical end, his conduct, though in appearance prudential, 

 is lifted into the higher category by the end to which it is 

 subservient. 



We may now resume our account of the course by which 

 the reactions of the conscience to single acts develop into 

 general rules of objective morality. The special functions 



