CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 153 



We have here, rather than in heredity, the cause which 

 produces different types of character within the same 

 community, and an explanation of the fact that there is 

 one moral code for the East End of London, and another 

 for the West End ; one for the lawyer, and another for the 

 thief. 



The common code will not agree exactly with the facts 

 of any individual conscience. Its relation to them will 

 be like that which is borne by the generalizations of psycho 

 logy to the particular experiences on which they are based. 

 Except in the case of men of an exceptionally elevated 

 character its standard will be materially higher than that 

 of each individual if left to himself. Ignorance of the exact 

 feelings of others makes it a matter of prudence to profess 

 a standard which we think is high enough to satisfy them ; 

 and each man is naturally desirous to give as favourable 

 a representation of his own character as he thinks is likely 

 to be accepted. It follows that the collective standard, 

 though not the highest, is considerably above the average 

 level, and its tendency is to raise the moral tone of the 

 community generally, and of the majority of the individuals 

 within it. 



So far as he is known to us at all, the character of an 

 individual is the sum of his intentions, and, when we judge 

 his intentions, we judge the individual himself. This 

 introduces us to a new class of feelings and judgements, 

 distinct from the instinctive feelings which are excited 

 in us by the idea of an action or of motives as preparatory 

 to actions those, namely, of praise and blame. They 

 proceed from a distinct source, and, in alliance with the 

 ideas of goodness and badness which we owe to the con 

 science, culminate in the ideas of moral responsibility, 

 and moral merit or demerit. Not all responsibility is moral, 

 nor all merit and demerit. There is often merit in a 

 picture, and a man may be made responsible for acts which 

 he is under no moral obligation to perform, as when the 

 responsibility has been forced on him by external com 

 pulsion, or when the action has no ethical implications. 



