154 ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



The primitive feeling which lies at the root of our judge 

 ments of merit is, perhaps, gratitude, though that is not 

 quite certain ; about the feeling of wrong, which gives rise 

 to judgements of demerit, there is less room for doubt. 

 It is almost certainly derived from revenge. Both these 

 feelings are outside and independent of the operations of 

 the conscience. Gratitude is not the same thing as attrac 

 tion, nor revenge as repulsion, though the sentiments are 

 commonly united. We may be grateful to a man when 

 his act is not in itself admirable, if his intentions towards 

 us are benevolent ; or we may refuse to blame, as in the case 

 of vivisection, when we abhor the act, but the intention 

 is respectable. Whatever our judgement may be, it is 

 founded on an association of instincts. Throughout the 

 process there is nothing in the nature of inference, and, if 

 challenged, we should find ourselves unable to give intel 

 ligible reasons for our imputations. 



The transfer of our moral judgements from actions to 

 their motives has this principal advantage, that it adds 

 greatly to their certainty, and, consequently, to their 

 efficiency as the guardians of public and private morality. 

 The same act may be produced by many different motives, 

 and, until we know which was the true motive, we have no 

 means of deciding, in any single instance, whether praise 

 is appropriate or blame. A man who has received a benefit 

 may return it, either because it galls him to remain under 

 an obligation, or because he is grateful to his benefactor : 

 impatience of obligation is not a virtue ; gratitude is, but 

 the action itself is identically the same. Again, he may 

 kill another man either in self-defence or in defence of his 

 country, or with his consent, to save him from the prolonga 

 tion of a painful illness, or, finally, because he dislikes him, 

 or covets his possessions. If we know the motive, we can 

 predict the act with some degree of certainty ; envy, hatred, 

 malice, and uncharitableness rarely bear fruits that are 

 desirable, but a knowledge of the act will seldom enable 

 us to infer the motive. It is true that there is no absolute 

 certainty in either case. Ill results often proceed from 



