CHAPTER VI 



OBEDIENCE 



WHAT is here proposed is, first to define what we mean 

 by obedience, when regarded as a spring of action ; then 

 to distinguish it from other springs of action with which 

 it has been sometimes wrongly identified ; to give a short 

 account of its relations with some other springs of action 

 by which it is likely either to be furthered or to be coun 

 teracted ; and, finally, to inquire into its relations with the 

 moral consciousness ; that is to say, when it is considered 

 good, and when not. The choice of subject has been in 

 part determined by the reflection that this, though one of 

 the most general and practically important of the moral 

 impulses, and rightly insisted on as such by religious writers 

 of all ages, receives only scanty recognition in philosophy, 

 and is almost entirely overlooked in the individualist 

 hedonism which has given the tone to English thought 

 since the Reformation. 1 It affords as good an illustration 

 as can be found of the conflict of ethical ideals in the same 

 age and country. 



At starting, a possible source of confusion must be 

 guarded against. In common use the word obedience 

 denotes, not the spring of action, but the action itself. 

 When a man says You owe me obedience , he means that 

 there is some kind of obligation which should make you 

 act in accordance with his command, either habitually, 

 or on some particular occasion. But this is not by any 

 means the same thing as to say that you ought to have an 

 obedient temper generally. To obey is not necessarily to 

 be disposed to obey. A man with a naturally disobedient 



The secular life of our twentieth century opens with this virtue, 

 held in no high esteem. Professor James, Varieties of Religious 

 Experience, p. 310. 



