HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION 111 



never reproduces anything beyond the imagination of 

 what has been. Recollection of our youth does not 

 reproduce it. To attribute to organic structure 

 unconscious memory of past achievement, and 

 perception of new conditions of existence, as pre 

 paratory for suitable variation in apparatus, is a 

 hypothesis which attributes too much to the sen 

 sibilities of organism, too little to the characteristics 

 of mental phenomena. In addition to the problem 

 of organic existence, there is a mind-problem. It is 

 raised by our own life. Its character is patent 

 to observation, in the distinction between physical 

 phenomena and mental, in the contrast between the 

 life that depends on daily nutriment, and the life 

 which gains by rational experience. The contrast 

 belongs to natural history, just as the problem of 

 animal intelligence concerns higher orders of 

 animal life, to the exclusion of lower forms. In the 

 development of an individual human life, that which 

 needs explanation is the appearance of a new order 

 of activity, distinct from the movement of organic 

 structure. All physical action is movement of 

 apparatus ; we localise it according to differentiation 

 in structure ; the development of separate organs, we 

 attribute to the unfolding of the germ-cell. In the 

 entire course of this development, and in all its results, 

 we trace the application of laws of heredity. Like 

 produces like, through the fertilised germ-cell. In 

 the history of this reproduction, however, we do 

 not find explanation of the appearance of men 

 tal phenomena. Absence of this suggests that 

 these do not arise in development of the germ- cell. 

 We do not find as the result of its development, 



