SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 129 



equivalent in material existence. Qualities of objects 

 are very different from changes of feeling within us. 

 Sensory apparatus supplies a connecting bridge 

 between outer qualities and inner experiences; but 

 the efficiency of observational exercise, resulting ulti 

 mately in knowledge of objects, is neither in the 

 objects, nor in the organic apparatus placing con 

 sciousness in relation with them, but in the power of 

 the rational life itself. 



Mere sensory experience, in us as it is in animals, 

 must be assigned a separate place, as physiological, to 

 be grouped under a distinct classification. Observa 

 tion, resulting in knowledge of objects, and also in 

 knowledge of ourselves, stands on the other side. The 

 efficiency of sensitive structure has been exhausted, 

 before we distinguish sensations as differing from each 

 other. Discrimination of feelings thus proves to be 

 a first step towards distinguishing of things. This is 

 the familiar fact, constantly presenting evidence of a 

 function of life beyond organic functions. Without 

 further aid from organs of vision, and altogether by 

 reflective exercise, we perceive the rich variety of ex 

 perience belonging to a rational life. We do not any 

 longer contemplate observations of external objects 

 only, but ideas and associations, thoughts and fancies, 

 hopes and fears. Within this rich amplitude of ex 

 perience, we exercise power of self-criticism, in use of 

 which we estimate variously the worth of our thoughts 

 and reasonings, and judge of the warrant for our 

 expectations and apprehensions. The subject of 

 criticism is our own intellectual action, for which we 

 acknowledge individual responsibility. In this, we 

 affirm a causality which we do not attribute to sensory 



