140 EVOLUTION AND MAN S PLACE IN NATURE 



the later will appear quite subordinate. Is it true, then, 

 that man has almost infinitely larger power of associ 

 ating sounds and ideas than animals have ? Sounds 

 and ideas may be widely apart. Animals, from birds 

 upwards, are capable of vocalisation. Birds even exer 

 cise this power more largely than the higher mammals. 

 The dog and the horse are poor in comparison in 

 powers of vocalising. On the other hand, to classify 

 human language with sound, though not inaccurate, 

 is to exclude the significance of speech. It is as if 

 we were to classify a skilful rendering of a sonata of 

 Beethoven, with the grinding of a corn-mill. Passing 

 next to ideas, it is doubtful whether animals possess 

 ideas in any sense analogous to our ideas, which are 

 representations of objects as distinguished by an 

 aggregate of qualities. Let us, however, grant all this 

 to the higher mammals, a very liberal concession, 

 surely, and even then we have an exceedingly 

 narrow statement of the uses of rational power. Let 

 us grant further, that Darwin contemplated a much 

 wider definition of idea, including even our inductive 

 processes, and general conclusions dependent on these, 

 for we do talk in a loose way of our ideas of the 

 order of things in the universe. Perplexity comes 

 now from the other side. How can we attribute to 

 the higher mammals any share in exercise of this 

 kind ? He who ventures on this suggestion, en 

 counters the risks consequent on minimising differ 

 ences, instead of securing the advantages coming 

 from exact statement of data, and deliberate inter 

 pretation of procedure. Still greater perplexity lies 

 further afield. If we grant so much to the higher 

 mammals, we are granting to them mind, even if it 



