SENSORY AND RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 141 



be oi a lower type than human intelligence. In doing 

 so, we admit an essential difference between sensible 

 discrimination common to all animal life, and in 

 telligent discrimination possible only to the higher 

 mammals and to man. 



As to our own powers, we have the certainty of ex 

 perience. We are conscious of our own rational 

 guidance at once of physical activity, and of thought; 

 we are conscious of deliberate formation of purpose, 

 and of voluntary execution of it; we recognise our 

 responsibility for reflection, for government of passion, 

 and for regulation of conduct. In accordance with 

 knowledge of our own powers, we hold our fellow-men 

 responsible for their conduct. We do not regard even 

 the highest animals as responsible in this way. For 

 us, self-knowledge is so distinct from our organism 

 that we cannot warrantably assign to our organic 

 functions either responsibility for our wrong-doing, 

 or the causality of our well-doing. Our personality 

 is distinct from organic functions which disease may 

 assail. On the testimony of consciousness, including 

 rational discrimination of motives, purpose, laws and 

 emls of action, men of all ages have recognised in 

 themselves a duality of life, physical and rational, and 

 have held more or less clearly a doctrine of the 

 separate existence of the soul. This doctrine seems 

 tnVonly adequate interpretation of the phenomena 

 of human, life, distinguishing man from all animal 

 existence, whether it be lower or higher in the scale 

 of organism. 



A constructive theory of human life formed on 

 physiological data fails, because of the contrast 

 between sensible discrimination and rational. When 



