ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 151 



failed to localise rational functions, by planting them 

 hTstructure. If this be so, the theory of Evolution, 

 alTan argument for continuity of life, is involved in 

 serious difficulty, in its attempt to include rational 

 life. Has not Darwin been over sanguine in his view . 

 ofjinalogies ? Has not Wallace shown himself more 

 strict In &quot;&quot;adherence to scientific conditions ? How s 

 the&quot; matter stands, will depend on the conclusions 

 warranted by study of the relations of human intelli 

 gence to animal life. 



In the contrast between sensible discrimination 

 andlFational, we have a definition of intelligence/^ 

 not &quot;only compatible with the theory of Evolution, but 

 even suggested by it. The scientific view of the 

 structure and functions of the sensori-motor system 

 leads forward to a boundary-line beyond which lies a 

 new phase of activity. In touching the limits of sensi 

 bility, we forthwith recognise the action of a higher 

 life. Power of reasoning is the central feature, typical 

 of this higher order of power. Negatively, intelli 

 gence is non-sensible discrimination, a distinguish 

 ing of difference to which sensibility is unequal. 

 Positively, intelligence is discrimination of the 

 meaning of sensible impressions. This is its simplest 

 form of exercise, beyond which lies all that is involved 

 in dealing inductively with the problems of existence. 



That there is in the life of the higher mammalia 

 more than merely sensible experience, is generally 

 admitted. We cannot grant higher functions, without 

 granting higher faculty. Intelligence, even in its 

 simplest phase, transcends sensibility, involving dis 

 crimination of the objective significance of sensory 

 impressions. By this higher exercise, sensible dis- 



