ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 153 



mediately thereafter touch another object, we feel the 

 difference; when we say the first object is a chair, the 

 second a book, this is intelligent discrimination. 



Let us, then, put the two forms of definition 

 together. Intelligence is non-sensible, because supra- 

 sensible, recognition of difference; a discrimination 

 transcending sensible experience. Intelligence is 

 mt^retatkm . pf_ sensible experience jtself, so as to 

 recognise, Jjts objective significance. The former 

 definition excludes what sensory apparatus supplies, 

 treating sensible experience as preliminary to know 

 ledge proper. The latter makes interpretation of 

 sensible impressions the simplest phase of intelligent 

 life. More advanced phases appear in the attain 

 ing of rationalised knowledge. These definitions 

 include animal intelligence along with human. A 

 common basis of intelligence belongs to both. To 

 man alone belongs the free exercise of rational power, 

 seeking interpretation of existence, in all its forms 

 and relations. How much is to be made of this 

 difference is the next question. The definition of 

 intelligence is secured by reference to the limits of 

 sensory apparatus on the one hand, and to our 

 conscious self-directed mental activity on the other. 

 Every life which passes beyond sensible experience to 

 distinguish parts of objects, and the several qualities 

 of objects, exercises a measure of intelligence. Still 

 higher than this, is the rational life, proceeding by 

 inductive process to the recognition of general truth. 

 The life so exercised gathers knowledge and passes 

 more or less freely into a sphere of truth, distinct 

 from that included within the sphere of experience. 

 That some animals are equal to the lower exercise of 



