214 EVOLUTION AND MAN S PLACE IN NATURE 



attainment does not become a starting-point for 

 higher effort. Left to itself, the animal relapses to a 

 life which seeks only the satisfaction of animal wants. 

 It does not appear that effort having for its end the 

 attainment of knowledge, belongs to animal life, 

 whether in a state of nature, or under domestication. 

 These limitations of intelligent action, when compared 

 with normal action of a rational life, seem to show that 

 in the contrast between the higher mammals and man, 

 we are contemplating mind/ in two distinct types, a 

 lower and a higher. Granting a common basis of in 

 telligence, capable of interpreting sensory experience, 

 including impressions made by visible and audible signs 

 and adding to this the results of co-operation ; there 

 remains a difference of power so enormous, as to 

 require that a distinction be drawn between intelli 

 gence and reason; between animal intelligence, 

 and rational power. A power concerned only with 

 the relations of interpretation to action, differs widely 

 from a power of reason (distinctively rational 

 power ), concerned with the relations of experience 

 to a sphere of knowledge. This difference is such that 

 we are impressed more by marks of contrast than by 

 marks of resemblance. As these two phases of power 

 appear constantly together in our own experience, we 

 can readily distinguish them. We use a lower power, 

 when we act upon a given signal, or at the call of 

 another ; and a greatly higher power when, by process 

 of reflection, we seek the satisfaction of our own mind 

 as to the cause of any occurrence, or judge of our 

 interest in imagined lines of procedure, or of our duty 

 within given conditions. Nothing at all recondite is 

 involved in this distinction. Whatever perplexity 



