228 EVOLUTION AND MAN S PLACE IN NATURE 



observers insist upon non-interference. Psychologists 

 must do the same, for there are two modes of obser 

 vation, though not two methods of induction. The 

 one is a mode proper to natural history as a science of 

 organic life, the other proper to psychology as a science 

 of intellectual procedure. While these two modes of 

 observation are distinct, the rational basis of pro 

 cedure in reaching inductions is the same. It is 

 only because the phenomena of organic action and of 

 mental are different, that we speak of two phases of 

 life, two spheres of existence, distinguishing organism 

 from mind. It is only because mental phenomena 

 in animal life are restricted to the lowest order 

 of phenomena in our consciousness, that we are 

 unable to acknowledge them as germinal forms 

 from w r hich the higher functions could unfold. There 

 is not here any analogy such as would place animal 

 intelligence in relation such as that of the germ-cell 

 to the mature embryo. 



Everything contributing towards scientific induc 

 tions confirms the distinction we are now drawing. 

 Take together law and results, in the field of organism. 

 Natural selection acts only by the accumulation of 

 slight modifications of structure or instinct. We 

 here recognise the co-action of environment and 

 organism pressure from without, inducing action 

 from within. If we think away the external pressure, 

 results are unattainable, forms of existence become 

 stationary. This scientific hypothesis is the product 

 of the thinker, who has in imagination placed things 

 together, though they are visible only as things 

 apart. Take now the rational power concerned in 

 the elaboration of this theory. Where is the external 



