ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 243 



distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is 

 not enough to have a confused perception of some 

 thing in general; unless the mind has a distinct 

 perception of different objects and their qualities, it 

 would be capable of very little knowledge. Let us, 

 then, consider the natural history of this power of 

 discerning and distinguishing between the several 

 ideas in consciousness. 



There is a marked difference between that com 

 pounding which is only association in experience, as 

 when the dog recognises his master by shape, smell, 

 and voice/ as so many distinct marks by which he 

 knows him; and the compounding which is the 

 result of deliberate comparison. What we do attribute 

 to the dog is the distinguishing of his master by 

 sight, by smell, by hearing ; for he is clearly guided 

 by any one of these ; sometimes by one, sometimes by 

 another. We do not, however, attribute to the animal 

 the comparing and compounding of these impres 

 sions; so as to form a conception of the distinctive 

 qualities which give rise to them. We recognise only 

 correlated sensory impressions, and their effects in 

 action. Sensory impressions, carried by molecular 

 action along the nerve-fibre to the nerve-cell, and 

 through that to the motor-nerve, and so onward to 

 the muscle, is a continuous course of action which 

 we attribute wholly to organism. These are common 

 functions of organic life. Mental phenomena do 

 not appear within this area. We do not attribute 

 intelligence to any animal on the ground of these 

 phases of action. To identify mental phenomena, 

 we must get beyond these. Rising above them, we 

 remark how the animal interprets our signs, when we 



