ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 249 



serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a 

 thought, like to some thought we had before, and 

 which, being pronounced to others, may be to them a 

 sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not, in 

 his mind/ 1 Mill naturally adds, Names do much 

 more than this ; but whatever else they do, grows out 

 of, and is the result of this. 2 The name or mark, 

 however much it may express, does not account for 

 the thought uttered. Beyond this, vocalising is a 

 function of organism; various forms of sensibility 

 and of excited feeling in animal life find vocal ex 

 pression, in sounds varying according to diversities 

 in structure. All vocalisation thus belongs to the 

 history of signs; articulate language is the highest 

 product in this history. But its life-history, so to 

 speak, is quite distinct. Yocal organs and their 

 use do not help us here. We are concerned with 

 internal causality. The contrast between organic 

 and mental action is so marked that vocalisation is 

 reduced to a subordinate position. Physical fear 

 finds physical expression in animal economy, as in 

 the scream of the blackbird when a cat is seen 

 crouching near. Physical joy finds utterance in like 

 manner, as in the barking of a dog, when his master 

 starts for a walk. Thought expresses itself in the 

 naming of things observed. The difference is vast. 

 What we mean by mental, in contrast with organic, 

 is manifest here as elsewhere. All names are names 

 of something real or imaginary ; but all things have 

 not names appropriated to them individually. For 



1 Hobbes s Elements of Philosophy, Pt. I. chap. ii. 4. Moles- 

 worth s Collected Works, i. p. 16. 



2 Mill s Logic, Bk. I. chap. ii. 



