ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 251 



not be found in the history of language. Dr. 

 Komanes is unfortunate in the prominence given to 

 language throughout his discussion of the relations 

 of simple and complex ideas, of percepts and 

 concepts. He says : The word &quot; idea &quot; I will use as 

 a generic term to signify indifferently any product of 

 imagination from the mere memory of a sensuous 

 impression up to the result of the most abstruse gener 

 alisation/ 1 His classification of ideas he gives in the 

 following form : By &quot; simple idea,&quot; &quot; particular idea,&quot; 

 or &quot; concrete idea,&quot; I understand the mere memory of 

 a particular sensuous perception. By &quot;compound 

 idea,&quot; &quot; complex idea,&quot; or &quot; mixed idea,&quot; I understand 

 the combination of simple, particular, or concrete 

 ideas into that kind of composite idea which is possible 

 without the aid of language. Lastly, by &quot; general idea,&quot; 

 &quot; abstract idea,&quot; &quot; concept,&quot; or &quot; notion,&quot; I understand 

 that kind of composite idea which is rendered possible 

 only by the aid of language, or by the process of 

 naming abstractions as abstractions. 2 The references 

 to memory and to language are too conspicuous here ; 

 the references to action of intelligence too slight. If a 

 c simple idea is defined as mere memory of a par 

 ticular sensuous impression, this so-called memory 

 may be mere recurrence of excitation dependent on 

 sensitiveness of the nerve fibres. This is not memory. 

 Kecurrence of excitation is not recollection. Take, for 

 example, the dog s smell of food awakening appetite. 

 If this sensuous impression were renewed with return 

 of hunger, there would be revived activity of the 



1 Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 118. This is the weak point 

 in H. B. Medlicott s able discussion, The Evolution of Mind in Man. 



2 Mental Evolution in Man, p. 34. 



