ANIMAL AND RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 253 



legitimate induction. 1 On the same lines, must we 

 not say that a blackbird forms a concept of a cat ; and 

 that an insect forms a concept of a ripe bud ? Utter 

 ances of this class are unsustained by observation, and 

 create disadvantages for research. 



Let us keep to the single question of comparative 

 intelligence, as illustrated in the dog and in man, 

 afterwards seeking along this line the origin of the 

 most abstruse generalisation. Whether the dog does 

 combine the several characteristics of his master in a 

 single complex idea, seems doubtful. As Locke said, 

 these may be only so many distinct marks by which 

 he knows him. The need for reserve as to inferences 

 from memory must be admitted. But we may grant 

 that, if a single sensuous impression may be recalled, 

 a simultaneous combination of sensuous impressions 

 may be simultaneously recalled. This is simple in 

 human intelligence. We form complex ideas such as 

 tree, horse, house. If it be said, as by Sully, 

 that there is here a passive process of assimilation ; l 

 or if we say, with J. S. Mill, that the characteristic 

 visual appearance of an object easily gathers round it 

 by association, the ideas of all other peculiarities which 

 have in frequent experiences co-existed with that ap 

 pearance ; 2 it is only thereby shown with what facility 

 our intellectual processes are executed. On the other 

 hand, it seems thereby to become more difficult to 

 attribute such mental exercise to the more intelligent 

 animals. There seems more to favour Locke s repre 

 sentation that the animal has only so many distinct 

 marks by which he knows an object. Most commonly 



1 Outlines of Psychology, p. 342. 



2 Examination of Hamilton s Philosophy, p. 403. 



