THE HUMAN WILL 

 d. The Function of Reason 



When we speak of man as a &quot;rational animal,&quot; 

 or of the &quot;dictates of reason,&quot; we must beware of 

 confused thought. Perhaps we may most clearly 

 observe the influence of the reason on the will 

 when we clearly see its limitations. 



There is significance and leading in the titles of 

 those great works by which Alexander Bain helped 

 to distinguish the sixth decade of last century 

 the decade that saw his great application of physi 

 ology to psychology, the publication of The Ori 

 gin of Species and of the Principles of Psychology. 

 Those works were called The Senses and the In 

 tellect and The Emotions and the Will. It is the 

 emotional part of our nature, and that alone, 

 which furnishes the force of all volition whatso 

 ever. Every act of will is determined by the 

 prepotent motive; and it is self-evident that no 

 intellectual percept or concept is a motive as such. 

 This, as I see it, is the objection a very grave 

 objection to Professor William James s term 

 ideomotor, which unequivocally suggests that ideas 

 have motor powers. It is not so. In aiming the 

 arrow you undoubtedly influence its course, but 

 though you aimed for an aeon it would go not 

 whither until the bow was released. The main 

 spring of willing is wishing, is desire. We act 

 because we want, and our reason is not the driving- 

 shaft, but the rudder. Reason, to vary the image, 

 is not the breeze, but the pilot. 



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