But, before doing so, let us make a digression 

 concerning our concept of sin, or moral evil. It 

 does not need more than a few moments impartial 

 consideration of the subject to compel agreement 

 with Spencer when he declares that &quot; happiness 

 is an inexpugnable element of the conception&quot; of 

 good. The good, or the good action, is that which 

 makes for the happiness of some one. No matter 

 what the religion or the philosophy, this remains 

 true grounded as it is in biological facts. An 

 action may be thought to be, and may indeed be, 

 good, though it makes for present pain or unhap- 

 piness, but only because the present discipline 

 makes for future happiness on this earth, or the 

 present renunciation for an eternally happy life 

 hereafter. Even if the present or future happi 

 ness of self or others be not thought of, yet an ac 

 tion may be deemed good because it is conceived 

 as pleasing, or conducing to the happiness of, the 

 Deity. Hence it is self-evident that physical, men 

 tal, and moral evil are, in the last analysis, one; for 

 the moral evil which does not entail physical or 

 mental unhappiness to some one, human or divine, 

 cannot even be conceived. 



Further, the Spencerian analysis of the concept 

 of evil furnishes a further argument in refutation 

 of pessimism. Optimism, so called, or the belief 

 that life brings a predominance of pleasure over 

 pain, is so universally admitted that it is every 

 where and at all times implicit in all systems of 

 ethics and in all our moral judgments. Did life 

 ao 295 



