ON MIND AS UNKNOWABLE 



involves the identification of conscioitsness with 

 mind, an error which is more than verbal, more 

 than relevant to the superstructure of the system, 

 but vitiates it root and branch, and is comparable 

 only to the analogous error which has made ma 

 terialism a name of perpetual scorn. The classic 

 researches of many students, varying in philosophic 

 stand-point as widely as did Carpenter and Myers, 

 have revealed to us the amazing fact, the full 

 philosophic and ontological significance of which 

 has hitherto been appreciated by few, if any, that 

 consciousness, even as known to the conscious 

 subject himself, is precisely the analogue of matter 

 as known to him. Each is the expression, appear 

 ance, or phenomenon of an underlying reality ; 

 and as he can never know not-mind in its essence, 

 since his consciousness cannot become identified 

 with its objects, so he can never know mind in its 

 essence, since his consciousness can never become 

 identified with the non-conscious entity of which 

 it is the efflorescence, or phenomenon. 



It is scarcely possible to overestimate the validity 

 and certainty of this conclusion. Let us consider 

 some of the evidence in its favor. In the first 

 place, we have seen that the academic doctrine of 

 the immediate knowableness of mind can be dis 

 proved by the reductio ad absurdum, directly we 

 contrast its pretensions with the notorious and, as 

 I believe, essentially insoluble difficulties of psy 

 chology. On the academic theory, there is only 

 one plain - sailing, self - evident science, which is 

 &amp;gt;3 343 



