MIRACLES AND SPECIAL PROVIDENCES. 57 



the grounds of our belief in that order. With a vigor of 

 logic rarely equalled, and with a confidence in its conclu 

 sions never surpassed, he disposes of this belief in a manner 

 calculated to startle those who, without due examination, 

 had come to the conclusion that the order of Nature was 

 secure. 



What we mean, he says, by our belief in the order of 

 Nature, is the belief that the future will be like the past. 

 There is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the slightest rational 

 basis for this belief. 



&quot; That any cause in Nature is more permanent than its existing and 

 known effects, extending further, and about to produce other and more 

 instances besides what it has produced already, we have no evidence. 

 Let us imagine,&quot; he continues, &quot; the occurrence of a particular physical 

 phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single occurrence we should 

 have but the very faintest expectation of another. If it did occur again, 

 once or twice, so far from counting on another occurrence, a cessation 

 would occur as the most natural event to us. But let it continue one 

 hundred times, and we should find no hesitation in inviting persons from 

 a distance to see it ; and if it occurred every day for years, its occur 

 rence would be a certainty to us, its cessation a marvel. . . . What 

 ground of reason can we assign for an expectation that any part of the 

 course of Nature will be the next moment what it has been up to this 

 moment, i. e., for our belief in the uniformity of Nature ? None. No 

 demonstrative reason can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence of 

 a fact of Nature is no contradiction. No probable reason can be given, 

 for all probable reasoning respecting the course of Nature is founded upon 

 this presumption of likeness, and, therefore, cannot be the foundation 

 of it. No reason can be given for this belief. It is without a reason. 

 It rests upon no rational grounds, and can be traced to no rational prin 

 ciple.&quot; 



&quot; Every thing,&quot; Mr. Mozley, however, adds, &quot; depends 

 upon this belief, every provision we make for the future, 

 every safeguard and caution we employ against it, all cal 

 culation, all adjustment of means to ends supposes this be 

 lief ; and yet this belief has no more producible reason for 

 it than a speculation of fancy. ... It is necessary, all-im- 



