xxviii HUMANISM 



ations of the word would still connect with Humanism a 

 Renascence of Philosophy ? And shall we not accept this 

 reminiscence as an omen for the future ? For it is clear, 

 assuredly, that Philosophy has still to be born again to 

 enter on her kingdom, and that her votaries must still be 

 born again to purge their systems of the taint of an 

 inveterate barbarism. But some of these suggestions 

 verge, perhaps, upon the fanciful : it suffices to have shown 

 that Humanism makes a good name for the views I seek 

 to label thus, and that in such extension of its meaning 

 its old associations lose no force but rather gain a subtler 

 flavour. 



To claim that in its philosophic use Humanism may 

 retain its old associations is not, however, to deny that 

 it must enter also into new relations. It would be vain, 

 for instance, to attempt concealment of the fact that to 

 Naturalism and Absolutism its antagonism is intrinsic. 

 Naturalism is valid enough and useful as a method of 

 tracing the connexions that permeate reality from the 

 lowest to the highest level : but when taken as the last 

 word of philosophy it subjects the human to the arbitra 

 ment of its inferior. Absolutism, on the other hand, 

 cherishes ambitions to attain the superhuman ; but, rather 

 than admit its failure, it deliberately prefers to delude 

 itself with shadows, and to reduce concrete reality to the 

 illusory adumbration of a phantom Whole. The difference 

 thus is this, that whereas Naturalism is worthy of respect 

 for the honest work it does, and has a real use as a partial 

 method in subordination to the whole, Absolutism has no 

 use, and its explanatory value is nothing but illusion. 

 As compared with these, Humanism will pursue the 

 middle path ; it will neither reject ideals because they 

 are not realized, nor yet despise the actual because it can 

 conceive ideals. It will not think the worst of Nature, 

 but neither will it trust an Absolute beyond its ken. 



