34 HUMANISM n 



at the same time or before, having the right habit of 

 action, so that, as Roger Ascham has said, &quot; ill-doings 

 breed ill-thinkings, and of corrupted manners spring 

 perverted judgments &quot; ? 



And do I not contend rightly ? 



I am not denying that your view is right, though 

 perhaps you over-state the impossibility of separating 

 ethical theory from ethical practice. What I should like 

 you to see, however, is that this same doctrine may be 

 extended also to speculative matters. Why should we 

 not contend that the true meaning and right understanding 

 of theoretical principles also appears only to him who is 

 proposing to use them practically ? Can we not say that 

 the Scythian was both prudent and wise who would not 

 grant that 2 and 2 made 4 until he knew what use was 

 to be made of the admission ? Just as the wicked man 

 destroys his intellectual insight into ethical truth by his 

 action, 1 so the mere theorist destroys his insight and 

 understanding of &quot; theoretical &quot; truth by refusing to use 

 that truth and to apply it practically, failing to see that, 

 both in origin and intention, it is a mass of thoroughly 

 practical devices to enable us to live better. 



I cannot admit that the two cases are at all parallel. 

 In practical matters indeed I rightly hold that action and 

 insight are so conjoined as not to admit of separation, but 

 to extend this doctrine to the apprehension of theoretic 

 truth would lead to many absurdities. 



For instance ? 



Well, for one thing, you would have to go into training 

 for the attainment of philosophic insight after the fashion 

 of an Indian Gymnosophist whom I once met in Asia 

 and who wished to convert me to the pernicious doctrine 

 that all things were one. 



How did he propose to effect this ? 



Well, in the first place he declared that truths could 

 not be implanted in the soul by argument, but must grow 

 out of its essence by its own action. So he refused to 

 give any rational account of his opinions, but told me 



1 Cp. Eth, Nic. vi. 5. 6, vi. 12. 10, vii. 8. 4. 



