in TRUTH 57 



right. For an analysis of the valuation true and false/ 

 whether or not it is possible for other purposes, would 

 hardly be germane to logic. 



Ill 



We are however still sufficiently remote from what 

 is ordinarily meant by truth. For truth is conceived 

 as something objective and coherent, while the truth- 

 valuations we have recognized are individual claims, and 

 so far seem chaotic. We may have found indeed the 

 bricks out of which the temple of Truth is to be built, but 

 as yet we have but a heap of bricks and nothing like a 

 temple. Before, moreover, we can venture to erect the 

 actual structure of objective Truth we must consider (a) 

 the nature of the ground over which the truth-valuation 

 is used, (If) the way in which our bricks cohere, i.e. the 

 formal nature of truth. 



As to (a), the use of truth lies in the valuation of 

 fact : truth is value in the apprehension of fact. 

 The objects of our contemplation when valued as true 

 become facts, and facts (or what we take to be such) 

 become available for knowledge when valued as true. 

 The system of truth therefore is constructed by an inter 

 pretation of fact. But this interpretation conforms to 

 certain building laws, as it were. It consists in the use 

 of concepts, and postulates the fundamental principles of 

 thought. 



Hence () these result in a certain formal character of 

 truth. Every assertion formally claims to be true, and 

 causes endless confusion if this formal claim is identified 

 with real, and even absolute, truth. Again, whatever is 

 harmonious ( consistent ) with the fundamental assump 

 tions of our conceptual interpretation of reality is in one 

 sense true. Any non-contradictory collocation of words 

 has formal truth. But it is truth in a narrower sense 

 than that required for material truth. 1 In its fullest 



1 Cp. p. 98 note. 



