66 HUMANISM iv 



interaction is just as primary a fact as the existence of the 

 world itself, and the assertion that things act on one 

 another is, in Kant s phrasing, an analytical proposition, 

 which merely expands what was already asserted in 

 saying there is a world. 



But is this latter proposition one which requires 

 explanation ? Have we not learnt from Lotze himself 1 

 that it is an improper question to ask why there should 

 be a world at all, since the given existence of the world 

 is the basis and presupposition of all our questionings ? 

 That has always seemed to me one of the most luminous 

 and valuable of Lotze s contributions to philosophy, and 

 if it is an error to attempt to derive the existence of the 

 world, it must be equally mistaken to derive the interaction 

 of the world s elements. For coexistence and interaction 

 have been shown to be equivalent. 



The problem of interaction, therefore, disappears. 

 Or rather, it is merged in that of the existence of a 

 world in general of which it is a variant. And the 

 existence of a world is not a problem for philosophy. 

 There is not, then, on Lotze s principles any need to 

 recognize any unity of things other than that which 

 consists of their actual interactions. Having a plurality 

 of interacting things given it, our thought may distinguish 

 a unity implied in this, viz. the possibility of their 

 interaction. But this unity is not more real or more 

 valuable than the plurality, but less so. Nor can it be 

 extolled as the ground of all reality. It is merely an 

 ideal reflection of the actual. It does not assert more 

 than that when a thing is actual it must be conceived as 

 also possible, and in this case we are forbidden to pry 

 into the questions how either the actuality or the 

 possibility came about. So far from unity in this sense 

 therefore being a royal road to Monism, it is the common 

 ground which Monism shares with Pluralism ; nay, it is 

 the very fact which, by implying plurality, renders 

 possible the metaphysical doctrine that plurality is the 

 ultimate term of all real philosophic explanation. 



1 E.g., Met. 5 and 11, Trans, pp. 36, 46. 



