78 HUMANISM 



IV 



defence of Free Will, which accord with it but badly. As 

 already stated, Lotze cannot dispense with this conception 

 in order to uphold the conception of a Divine governance, 

 which re-establishes the identical meaning of the world 

 against the disturbances due to free actions. And it is 

 in this way that he explains the fact that the world 

 exhibits a succession of phases, all of which, we are 

 required to believe, mean one and the same thing. But 

 the reflection is obvious that these free actions also 

 are included in the Absolute, and that their existence is 

 one of its given characteristics. Metaphysically, therefore, 

 we have to say that the Absolute is subject to these un 

 caused perturbations, which exhibit its internal instability. 

 It is this inner instability which is the ultimate ground 

 for change, and the question which in the Metaphysics 

 ( 83) Lotze tried so hard to put aside, viz. as to the 

 reason why the Absolute is in motion, returns with renewed 

 force. Lotze had there contended that the motion must 

 be accepted as a fact and its direction likewise. But can 

 the kind of motion be similarly accepted ? We may not 

 in ordinary life require an explanation when we see a 

 man walking in the usual fashion, but when we see him 

 staggering along as though about to fall and only just 

 preserving his equilibrium, we think that such a mode of 

 progression requires an explanation, and probably put it 

 down to alcohol. Yet this somewhat undignified simile, 

 si parva licet componere magnis, exactly expresses the 

 characteristic motion of the Absolute according to Lotze. 

 The world is ever recovering the equilibrium which is 

 constantly endangered ; it maintains itself in a constant 

 struggle against the consequences of its own inner in 

 stability. And what we call Evil is merely one of the 

 incidents of the struggle. If then it were true that the 

 motion of the world required no explanation, it would be 

 equally true that the evil of the world required none. 

 But this is not only a conclusion monstrous in itself, but 

 one by no means accepted by Lotze. He admits that 

 the problem of Evil is a real one, and only regrets the 

 failure of all the solutions proffered. But of this more 



